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ELECTORAL COLLEGE
Are Presidential Electors Free to Vote As They Wish,
Despite a State’s Popular Vote?
CASE AT A GLANCE
Washington and Colorado state laws require presidential electors to vote for the state’s popular vote
winner. Peter Chiafalo, a Democratic presidential elector in Washington, in 2016 voted for Colin Powell
and not Hillary Clinton, who had won the state’s popular vote. He was fined $1,000 for doing so. Colorado
presidential elector Michael Baca did not cast his vote for Hillary Clinton, the Democratic candidate who
won the state’s popular vote, but for John Kasich, a Republican not on the ballot. Baca was removed as
an elector and replaced by an elector who voted for Clinton. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed
Chiafalo’s fine; the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found the replacement of Baca as
an elector was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality
of laws that require presidential electors to vote the way state law directs, subject to removal or fine for
failing to do so.

Chiafalo v. Washington
Docket No. 19-465
Colorado Department of State v. Baca
Docket No. 19-518
Argument Date: May 13, 2020
From: The Washington Supreme Court (Chiafalo), The Tenth Circuit (Baca)
by Alan Raphael & Elliott Mondry
Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Chicago, IL

ISSUES
1. Do state laws that require presidential electors to vote in
accordance with the state’s popular vote, or penalize those
who fail to do so, violate electors’ constitutional rights under
Article II or the Twelfth Amendment?
2. Does a presidential elector intending to vote for someone other
than the person to whom he or she was pledged have standing
under state law to object to being removed as an elector?

FACTS
Peter Chiafalo and 2 others were among the 12 Democratic
presidential electors elected for the State of Washington in
the 2016 presidential election. Pursuant to Washington state
law, electors must “perform the duties required of them by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.” RCW 29A.56. Electors
are expected to cast their ballots for the presidential candidate
who won the state’s popular vote. Because Hillary Clinton and
Tim Kaine, running for president and vice president respectively,
won the popular vote in Washington, the electors were required to
vote for them. However, Chiafalo and two other electors cast their
votes for Colin Powell for president and various persons for vice
president.
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Their votes were counted for the persons chosen by the electors,
not for the Democratic candidates receiving the majority of the
state’s votes. Washington state law indicates that any electors
who do not vote for their party’s candidate are subject to a ine
of up to $1,000. 5 RCW 29A.56.340. On December 29, 2016, the
Washington secretary of state ined Chiafalo and the other electors
$1,000 each for failing to vote in line with the state’s popular vote.
The electors challenged the law, claiming that a ine for voting
contrary to the popular vote of the state violates their Article II
and Twelfth Amendment rights. The electors contested their ines
in administrative proceedings. The administrative law judge did
not have the power to consider the constitutionality of the statute
and upheld the ines. The electors appealed to the State Superior
Court, which rejected their arguments. The Washington Supreme
Court afirmed the Superior Court’s ruling in an 8–1 opinion.
Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465 (Wash. Sup. Ct., 2019).
The United States Constitution states, “Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress[.]” United States Const., Art. II, § 1. The Washington
Supreme Court concluded that the state law requiring electors to
vote for the candidates receiving the majority of the state popular
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vote and ining any elector who fails to do so are justiied because
“the Constitution explicitly confers broad authority on the states to
dictate the manner and mode of appointing presidential electors.”
The court further reasoned that “nothing in Article II, Section 1
[of the United States Constitution] suggests that electors have
discretion to cast their votes without limitation or restriction by
the state legislature.” The court rejected the electors’ argument
that the state’s imposition of ines violated their First Amendment
rights.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Steven González stated, “‘[n]o
one faithful to our history can deny that the plan originally
contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would be
free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judgment
as to the [individuals] best qualiied for the Nation’s highest
ofices.’” (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 232 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)). The dissent reasoned that states have only the power
to appoint their electors but not the power to control them, thus
leaving electors with the discretion to vote in any manner they so
choose.
Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for
the winner of its state’s general election. Electors must “take the
oath required by law for presidential electors.” Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 1-4-304(1). State electors must cast their votes in the Electoral
College for the presidential candidate who “received the highest
number of votes at the preceding general election in this State.”
Id. at § 1-4-304(5). If an elector refuses to do so and instead votes
for someone else, the elector can be removed. The statute says if
there is a vacancy, “in the ofice of presidential elector because
of death, refusal to act, absence, or other cause, the presidential
electors present shall immediately proceed to ill the vacancy in the
Electoral College.” Id. at § 1-4-304(1).
Michael Baca (Mr. Baca), Polly Baca (Ms. Baca), and Robert
Nemanich (Nemanich) were selected as three of nine Colorado
presidential electors for the 2016 presidential election as a result
of the Democratic ticket winning the state. Baca v. Colorado
Department of State, No. 18-1173 (Co. Dist. Ct., 2019). The
Colorado secretary of state informed the group that, if any of them
were to vote against Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine, he would
likely remove the elector until everyone cast votes for Democratic
candidates.
On December 16, 2016, the electors gathered to cast their votes
for the president and vice president of the United States. Despite
Colorado law requiring presidential electors to cast their votes for
Hillary Clinton, the candidate who won the state’s popular vote,
Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich, the Republican governor
of Ohio, an unsuccessful candidate for president in the 2016
Republican primaries, instead. As a result, Colorado’s secretary
of state removed Mr. Baca as an elector, disregarded his vote, and
replaced him with an elector who voted for Hillary Clinton. Ms.
Baca and Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton despite wanting to
vote for John Kasich. The three sued the secretary of state alleging
a violation of their constitutional rights under Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment for removing Mr. Baca for not voting in
accordance to the state’s popular vote and effectively prohibiting
Ms. Baca and Nemanich from voting for John Kasich. Williams
v. Baca, No. 2016-cv-34522, (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 13, 2016). The
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District Court for the District of Colorado granted Colorado’s
motion to dismiss after inding all of the electors lacked standing
and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
because the U.S. Constitution does not bar states from binding
electors to vote for the candidate who wins the state’s popular vote.
Baca v. Colorado Department of State, No. 18-1173 (Co. Dist. Ct.,
2019).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
found that Mr. Baca had standing because he was removed from
his position as an elector, but that the other two appellants did
not have standing because they had not been prevented from
serving as electors. Baca v. Colorado Department of State, 935
F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019). The court concluded that Mr. Baca was
personally entitled to his position because he had been elected
to his position. It rejected Colorado’s argument that states may
exercise control over their electors. In the court’s view, the U.S.
Constitution empowers electors to be “free to vote as they choose”
in the Electoral College. The decision further held that a state’s
right to appoint an elector does not allow for removal of an elector
because the elector is exercising a federal function.
Justice Mary Beck Briscoe dissented. Baca v. Colorado Department
of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019) (Briscoe, dissenting). The
dissent concluded that the case was moot because no petitioner
sought damages. Justice Briscoe cited Lankford v. City of Hobart,
73 F.3d 283 (10th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that a claim
without damages is moot. A Section 1983 suit without a claim for
damages against a state was not “suficient to overcome mootness
[because the claim] was nonexistent.”
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the appeals,
which will be heard the same day. Chiafalo’s counsel iled a brief
for his client and Baca, but separate counsel will argue in each
case. The Court will likely make its decision by the end of the
current term well prior to the 2020 presidential election.

CASE ANALYSIS
The president and vice president of the United States are chosen
by members of the Electoral College chosen in each state. Article
II of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[e]ach State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress.” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Constitution does not
deine the term “manner.” The mechanism of choosing electors
is left up to the states. All but two states award all of the votes to
the winner of the statewide vote. Maine and Nebraska award the
winner of the statewide vote two electors, and the winner of each
congressional district vote receives one elector. The Constitution
requires the votes of the electors to be sent to Washington and
counted there. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Under Article II, each
elector casts two votes. The person with a majority of votes and the
most votes becomes president; the other majority vote total winner
becomes vice president. After the 1800 election resulted in a tie
vote between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both of whom
had run on the Democratic-Republican slate, the Constitution
was amended to provide for electors to vote separately for the two
ofices. U.S. Const. Amend. XII. The issue in this case is whether
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the states may direct how electors vote or penalize those who do
not vote for the candidate to whom they were pledged.
The Tenth Circuit in Baca’s case concluded that a state lacks the
power to remove an elector who votes contrary to state law. Baca
v. Colorado Department of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019). The
court further states that, although the Constitution grants to the
states the power to appoint electors, that power ceases once the
elector is selected.
The Electoral College’s purpose is discussed in the Federalist
Papers. Alexander Hamilton stated, “It was desirable that the sense
of the people should operate in the choice of the person” to be
president. The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). Thus, the
people exercise that role by choosing the electors who cast votes
to determine the president of the United States. According to
Hamilton, the presidential electors “should be…men most capable
of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station.…A small number
of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass,
will be most likely to possess the information and discernment
requisite to such complicated investigations.”
By 1796, political parties arose and regularly selected candidates
for president. Each state chooses electors, and, generally, the
electors’ votes have relected the popular will in the states.
However, throughout our country’s history, a small number of
electors have voted for a candidate other than the person to whom
the elector was pledged. The irst instance occurred in 1796, when
Samuel Miles voted for Thomas Jefferson instead of Samuel
Adams. Some electors have voted for the opposing party candidate
while many voted for persons not on the ballot. In 1872, after
liberal Republican-Democrat candidate Horace Greeley died after
the election, but before the electors cast their votes, all but three
of his electors voted for other candidates. All of these votes were
counted as cast except that the votes for the deceased Greeley
were disallowed. In no instance did electors’ votes contrary to the
state vote result in a change in the result of the election, although
the failure of 23 Virginian electors to vote for the Democratic
candidate for vice president in the 1836 election resulted in no
candidate receiving a majority of the votes; the Senate then
chose the vice president pursuant to the Twelfth Amendment and
selected the Democratic candidate.
In casting his vote as elector, Baca crossed off Clinton’s name from
the ballot and wrote in Kasich’s name. The Colorado secretary
of state voided the vote, required a new elector to be chosen,
and certiied all of the Colorado votes for Clinton. Meagan Flynn,
He tried to stop Trump in the electoral college. A court says his
‘faithless’ ballot was legal, The WA Post (Aug. 22, 2019, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/22/he-tried-stop-trumpelectoral-college-court-says-his-faithless-ballot-was-legal/).
Mr. Baca was elected as a presidential elector and had the duty of
casting his votes for the ofices of president and vice president.
He asserts that the Colorado secretary of state removing him as
an elector deprived him of fulilling the duties of that position
and prevented him from voting for Kasich, as he had determined
appropriate. Chiafalo, not having been removed as an elector,
cast his ballot as he thought appropriate and was subsequently
ined for doing so rather than voting for Clinton, who had won the
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majority of the state’s presidential vote. He claims that the state
government could not penalize him for performing his duties as
an elector under the Constitution. There is no issue of standing
in Chiafalo’s case, unlike the situation in Baca’s case. Even if the
Supreme Court inds that Baca lacked standing to maintain his
action, the Court will still have to rule in Chiafalo’s action and
decide whether electors are free to vote as they choose, without
being removed (as in Baca’s case) or ined (as in Chiafalo’s case)
for disregarding state law requiring them to vote for the victor of
the state’s popular vote.
After being removed as an elector, Mr. Baca sued for nominal
damages. The Tenth Circuit held that “Mr. Baca’s loss of his
ofice—however brief its existence—is an injury in fact.” Baca v.
Colorado Department of State, No. 18-1173 (Co. Dist. Ct., 2019).
Mr. Baca argues he suffered an injury through the loss of a
government ofice as an elector and thus has standing to request
damages. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926)).
Colorado’s Constitution expressly states that “the electors of the
electoral college shall be chosen by direct vote of the people.”
Colorado Const. sched. § 20. Mr. Baca was, in fact, voted for by the
people of Colorado and had a “personal entitlement” to serve as an
elector. When Mr. Baca was removed as an elector, he asserts that
he suffered an injury suficient to warrant his having standing in
this action.
It is generally unpopular for electors to vote against the wishes of
the voters who selected them. In the last half-century, a majority
of states has attempted to curtail the practice. Of the 50 states,
32, plus the District of Columbia, require electors to vote for a
pledged candidate. However, 17 of these states and the District of
Columbia do not have any penalty or procedure to prevent votes for
candidates other than the nominees of their party from counting
as an oficial vote. Washington, New Mexico, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Oklahoma impose a penalty for electors who
do not vote as pledged; 11 states cancel the vote and also provide
for the elector who cast the vote to be replaced with an elector who
will vote in accordance with the state’s popular vote. In Colorado
and Maine, no state law provides for the cancelation of these
votes, but their secretaries of state have determined they have
the authority to cancel these votes. Faithless Elector State Laws,
FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/faithless elector state laws (last
visited Feb. 2, 2019).
The Uniform Law Commission drafted and recommend a law
called the Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act (Act). The Act
requires electors to pledge to vote for a candidate. It further states
that electors will be replaced with an alternate elector if they do
not vote for the pledged candidate. Indiana, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, and Washington have adopted the Act as of
October 2019.
In the present case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit rejected Colorado’s argument that the power to
appoint electors includes a right to remove them. The court found
that Colorado relied on cases relating speciically to presidential
appointment and removal powers, which it viewed as irrelevant to
the removal of presidential electors. The appellate court held that
presidential electors exercise a federal function as opposed to a
state function when casting ballots. Baca v. Colorado Department
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of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934)). The court found that neither Article
II nor the Twelfth Amendment allows a state to remove or punish
electors who cast votes for candidates other than the nominees of
their party.
Chiafalo argues that electors, although chosen in the state,
derive their authority from the federal constitution and not the
state. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). Because
the electors are performing a federal function, Chiafalo argues,
the precedent of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), prevents the state from removing an elector
or imposing a ine as a result of the vote for a candidate other
than the nominees of their party because it unconstitutionally
interferes with a federal function. McCulloch held that Maryland
could not tax a federal bank created by Congress because federal
law is supreme over a contrary state law and the state taxation of
a federal function violates the Supremacy Clause, United States
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
Additionally, Chiafalo argues that the framers of the Constitution
intended presidential electors to choose their own candidates as
shown by the use of the word “vote” in referring to the electors’
duty. Voting is an act of discretion and free judgment. Chiafalo
cites a source contemporary to the adoption of the Constitution
as deining voting as “to speak for or in behalf of any person or
thing; also to chuse or elect a person into any ofice, by voting or
speaking[.]” Thomas Dyche and William Pardon, A New General
English Dictionary (11th ed. 1760). Therefore, Chiafalo argues that
voting is an act of discretion not subject to state control.
Washington argues that, although presidential electors exercise
a federal function, “they are not federal oficers or agents any
more than the state elector who votes for congressmen. They act
by authority of the state that in turn receives its authority from
the Federal Constitution.” Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465
(Wash. Sup. Ct., 2019) (citing Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952)).
Ray upheld an Alabama state requirement that electors chosen by
a political party must pledge to vote as electors for the candidate
of the party. However, there is no language in the Constitution nor
any Supreme Court decision that requires a presidential elector
to vote the way the elector pledged. It is within state power to
require a person to pledge to support a candidate of the national
party. Although Ray held that a state political party may require an
elector to pledge to support the candidates of the national party,
the decision did not determine whether the state had the authority
to enforce the pledge. Washington asserts that no language in the
Constitution prohibits a state from requiring electors to vote as
pledged or to ine them for not voting for the nominee of their party.
In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court recognized
that “the appointment and mode of appointment of electors
belong exclusively to the States under the Constitution of the
United States.” The McPherson Court upheld Michigan legislation
allocating one electoral vote to the winner in each congressional
district and two to the winner of the statewide vote, stating: “If
the legislature possesses plenary authority to direct the manner
of appointment, and might itself exercise the appointing power
by joint ballot or concurrence of the two houses, or according to
such mode as designated, it is dificult to perceive why, if the
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legislature prescribes as a method of appointment choice by vote,
it must necessarily be by general ticket, and not by districts.” It
noted that the state “acts individually through its electoral college
[and] by reason of the power of its legislature over the manner of
appointment, the vote of its electors may be divided.” Because the
Constitution does not provide how electors are to be appointed,
the state of Washington argues it is left exclusively to the state
legislature to deine the method of appointment by allowing states
to choose their own appointment methods through their own
state laws. The Twelfth Amendment requires the electors to meet
at the speciied date and time outlined by Congress and to cast
two votes for qualiied candidates. The Constitution, Washington
claims, does not limit a state’s authority in adding requirements
pertaining to presidential electors. Thus, it is within a state’s
authority under Article II, Section 1, to impose penalties, including
a ine, on electors who do not vote for the nominees of their party.
Such penalties, the state contends, do not interfere with any
federal function outlined in the Twelfth Amendment.

SIGNIFICANCE
These cases are important because the Supreme Court has the
opportunity to determine whether a presidential elector may
ignore a state law requiring electors to vote for the winner of the
popular vote or whether state law can remove or ine an elector
who fails to vote for the state’s popular vote winner. If the Court
concludes that electors may not be removed or punished for
voting as they consider appropriate, regardless of state law to the
contrary, the decision would uphold the validity of an unpopular
but frequent practice throughout our history. A ruling in favor of
the states’ position would settle an ongoing controversy and bar an
unpopular and seemingly anti-democratic practice. A ruling for the
electors would mean that they, rather than the voters in the states,
determine who is elected president, although it is likely that
the overwhelming percentage of electors would still vote for the
candidate with the popular vote majority in their states. Votes by
electors for persons other than the candidates of their parties have
never resulted in a change in who ultimately won the majority
of votes in the Electoral College, but such a result is possible
and would lead many to question the legitimacy of the president
selected in that way. If the Court holds that the state’s power to
determine the “manner” of selection of electors includes requiring
them to vote for the candidate receiving the most votes in the state
in the election, it will uphold the concept that the people get to
decide who will serve as president.
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 68 expressed the view that
the electors from each state would be the most qualiied and
knowledgeable persons to select the president. That view may have
relected a time when most people in the country lived in isolated
communities and lacked signiicant sources of information
about potential candidates. It also relected a time without
organized political factions or parties, although they arose soon
after the Constitution was adopted. Even if the rationale for the
constitutional provision no longer exists, the Constitution has not
been amended, and, according to Chiafalo and Baca, the provision
should be observed.
Although United States citizens have the right to vote for electors
pledged or listed to vote for the candidate of the voter’s choice,
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the actual votes for president are cast by the electors rather than
the statewide voters. The ruling in this case will likely determine
whether 538 individual electors choose the highest federal
executive oficers, as determined by the states’ popular votes, or
whether the electors may use independent judgment in deciding
which persons should be elected to hold the ofices.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES

The Constitution clearly leaves it up to the states to choose the
methods for selecting their electors, and the methods chosen by
states differ. Early in our national history, some states had electors
chosen by state legislatures with no popular vote for the ofices of
president and vice president. By the middle of the 19th century, all
states moved to holding popular votes for electors. Over the past
200 years, the overwhelming majority of electors has voted for the
candidates chosen by the political parties for the ofices, but in
many elections a small number of electors have not voted for the
candidates who won the most votes in the state. The independent
actions of these electors have generally been unpopular and have
never changed the outcome of a national election. The Supreme
Court is asked in these cases to determine if the states have the
power to require electors to vote as directed by the popular vote, or
be sanctioned or replaced for failing to do so, or whether the intent
of the framers of the Constitution and continued practice indicate
that electors are free to exercise independent judgment in casting
their votes.
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